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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
however, reversed this approach, and the rule now applied in Ohio
is that a personal injury release may be rescinded where there is
a mutual mistake as to the existence of an unknown injury at the
time of the execution of the release. Although many jurisdictions
hold that such a rule is more equitable, it nevertheless presents
serious problems for insurance companies who favor the finality
rule. A few states have even enacted statutes which further attack
the finality of releases.23 To combat this recent trend, insurance com-
panies ought to consider altering their present settlement practices
to take into account all the relevant factors. Furthermore, some
attempt ought to be made to more precisely establish the intent of
the parties in written form.
DAVID R. WILLIAMS
AGENCY - TORT LIABILITY OF AN OHIO EMPLOYER FOR
ACTS OF HIS SERVANT - ACTS OF A THIRD PERSON
ASSISTING A SERVANT
Fox v. Triplett Auto Wrecking, Inc.,
1 Ohio App. 2d 102 (1964).
A patron of the defendant wrecking company parked his car in
such a way as to block one of the two means of ingress and egress to,
an area in a building used by defendant to repair motor vehicles.
Despite two warning signs at the entrance to the area and an oral
protest by one of defendant's employees that the entrance should not
be blocked, the patron left the car and went inside to make a pur-
chase.
The defendant's employees had express instructions to order any
driver who parked in the entrance to move the vehicle, or if no
driver was in the vehicle to push the vehicle out of the entrance way.
Accordingly, the defendant's employees asked Mrs. Caldwell, a pas-
senger in the patron's car, to move it out of the entrance. When
23. A general release does not cover claims unknown at the time of executing the re-
lease. E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1542. A release obtained from a party in the hospital
within fifteen days after injury is inadmissible in court. MASS ANN. LAWS ch.271,
§ 44 (1956). A release obtained within five days after injury shall be voidable for
sixty days. MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, §- 11 (1957). Any statement obtained from the
injured party within thirty days after the accident is presumed fraudulent. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 602.01 (1961). A release is voidable if made within thirty days after
injury, or if made while the party is under a disability from the injury it shall be void-
able for six months. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-08 (1959).
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she responded that she did not know how to drive the car,' the de-
fendant's employee told her that a turn of the switch would start the
motor. As she turned the switch, the car moved quickly backward
crushing the plaintiff Fox, who was walking past the rear of the
car, against a brick wall. The issue presented to the Summit County
Court of Appeals was whether the defendant's employee was acting
within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of his mas-
ter's business in requesting Mrs. Caldwell to perform a task which
he could have performed himself.2 The court upheld a finding of
liability against both the defendant Triplett Auto Wrecking, Inc.
and Mrs. Caldwell,3 stating that "the fact that the employee herein
used a means of seeking to unblock the work area that was not
specifically permitted, or, even if forbidden, should not relieve Trip-
lett of liability, since the means chosen fell within the range of what
Triplett might reasonably expect an employee to use under similar
circumstances."4
As a general rule, a master is liable for the tort of a third person
assisting a servant where the servant has express or implied author-
ity to enlist such aid in furtherance of the master's business.5 Im-
1. There was some conflict in the testimony presented at the trial as to whether Mrs.
Caldwell told the Triplett employee that she did not know how to drive, or whether
she said she did not know how to drive the particular car in question. However, she
testified at the trial that she had a driver's license and knew how to drive a Buick. The
car involved in the case was a Chrysler. Fox v. Triplett Auto Wrecking, Inc., 1 Ohio
App. 2d 102, 103-04 (1964).
2. From a judgment rendered against Triplett Auto Wrecking, Inc. and Mrs. Caldwell,
the former appealed and presented several questions for consideration by the court of
appeals:- (1) whether the plaintiff presented any credible evidence to show that the
Triplett employee "insisted" or "demanded" that Mrs. Caldwell move the auto; (2)
whether the plaintiff presented any credible evidence that the Triplett employee was
acting within the scope of his employment or under some authority in "insisting" or
"demanding" that Mrs. Caldwell move the auto; (3) whether a request to a responsible,
licensed driver to move an improperly parked auto constitutes negligence; and (4)
whether, if a case of actionable negligence were made out, it was the proximate cause
of plaintiffs injuries. Fox v. Triplett Auto Wrecking, Inc., 1 Ohio App. 2d 102, 103-04
(1964).
3. 1 Ohio App. 2d 102 (1964), motion to certify denied, Ohio Sup. Ct. Case No.
338826 (Sept. 23, 1964).
4. Id. at 205.
5. Jacobi v. Nolan Inc., 122 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960); Hollidge v. Duncan,
199 Mass. 121, 85 N.E. 186 (1908); Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. 32,
50 Ad. 286 (1917); Williamson v. Pike, 140 S.C. 376, 138 S.E. 831 (1927); Lipman
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 108 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 711 (1917); Ostun v. South Carolina
Cotton & Oil Co., 102 S.C. 146, 86 S.E. 202 (1915); Banks v. Southern Express Co.,
73 S.C. 211, 53 S.E. 166 (1906); 35 AM. JUl. Master & Servant § 540 (1941); 37
C.J.S. Master & Servant § 564 (1948); 2 MECHE M, AGENCY § 1866 (2d ed. 1954).
See also Mcntire Street R.R. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio St. 224, 2 N.E. 333 (1885); Ohm v.
Miller, 31 Ohio App. 446, 167 N.E. 482 (1928), holding that the master owes no
duty to a stranger assisting a servant except the duty not to wantonly or willfully injure
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plied authority arises by implication from the circumstances or con-
ditions under which the service is to be performed in furtherance of
the master's business.6 Incidental benefit to the master is not con-
trolling in determining liability; and the servant must at all times
be acting with the purpose of furthering the master's business.'
A servant is not within the course of employment and, hence
does not further his master's business when he requests assistance
from a third person merely to suit his own convenience! In this
instance, the third person is considered merely a volunteer and not
a subservant for whose negligence the master would be liable.' This
distinction was not made in the instant case, nor even investigated.
Rather, the court relied heavily on Crowley v. Bolander1° and Ohm
v. Miller" in expounding on the principle that a servant has implied
authority to request assistance necessary from a third person when
an emergency situation arises. The existence of such an emergency
situation arises from the circumstances surrounding the incident and
is a question of fact for jury determination. 12
The Fox decision further suggests that when a master can rea-
sonably foresee that a servant will delegate his duties to a third per-
him. But see Garinger v. Zackary, 206 Ky. 229, 267 S.W. 182 (1924); St. Louis &
S.F.R.R. v. Bogwell, 33 Okla. 189, 124 P. 320 (1912), wherein it was held that the
master does owe a duty of ordinary care to a stranger assisting a servant.
In several other Ohio cases, the courts have recognized the general rule that a master
is liable for the torts of a third person assisting a servant where the servant enlists
such aid in furtherance of the master's business, but then have gone on to hold that
due to the particular facts in the case, the claim of liability against the master could
not be sustained. See, e.g., Cruikshank v. Frank Sherman Co., 153 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1957); Lima R.R. v. Little, 67 Ohio St. 91, 65 N.E. 861 (1902); Cleve-
land Terminal v. March, 63 Ohio St. 236, 58 N.E. 821 (1900); Travelers Fire Co. v.
Freeman Co., 104 Ohio App. 226, 145 N.E.2d 217 (1957); Smith v. Springgs, 98
Ohio App. 1, 127 N.E.2d 637 (1954).
6. Implied authority may include the performance of duties where: (1) the master
has entrusted the servant with a task which cannot be performed by him within a rea-
sonable time - Jacobi v. Nolan, Inc., 122 So. 2d 783, 788 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960); (2)
the nature of the work requires assistance - Jacobi v. Nolan, Inc., supra at 788; Marks
v. Rochester R.R., 146 N.Y. 181, 189, 40 N.E. 782, 784 (1895); (3) an emergency
situation exists - Jacobi v. Nolan, Inc., supra at 788; Marks v. Rochester R.R., supra
at 189, 40 N.E. at 784; or (4) authority is implied from the nature of the circum-
stances or conditions of the service to be performed - Jacobi v. Nolan, Inc., supra at
188; Marks v. Rochester R.R., supra at 190, 40 N.E. at 785; Crowley v. Bolander, 120
Ohio St. 553, 556 (1929). When any of the above mentioned elements are present,
the master is liable for the torts of a third person assisting the servant if the tort is
committed while engaged in furtherance of the master's business.
7. Marks v. Rochester R.R., supra note 6, at 189, 40 N.E. at 783.
8. Id. at 189, 40 N.E. at 784.
9. Ibid.
10. 120 Ohio St. 553, 166 N.E. 677 (1929).
11. 31 Ohio App. 446, 167 N.E. 482 (1928).
12. Marks v. Rochester R.R., 146 N.Y. 181, 188-89, 40 N.E. 782, 784 (1895).
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son, the master is liable for the acts of that third person. In apply-
ing this principle to the instant case, the court indulged in circular
and self-defeating reasoning. Granted that when the means and
method of accomplishing a task are left to a servant's determination,
the master is chargeable for the servant's negligence in carrying out
the directions of the master. 3 However, this principle is not wholly
applicable under the facts in the instant case. Although the de-
fendant-master's employees had express instructions as to how an
auto was to be removed from the entrance way, and conceding that
there may have been a slight deviation from the instructions, the
means ultimately used were neither foreseeable nor within the scope
of the servant's employment. First, Mrs. Caldwell told the defend-
ant's employee that she did not know how to move the car. Ac-
cording to the express instructions given the employee, the car
should have then been pushed out of the entrance way. Second, in
asking Mrs. Caldwell to start the car, the employee was serving his
own convenience. In Marks v. Rochester R.R., 4 a New York court
held that if a third person undertook upon the servant's solicita-
tion and for his convenience to assist the servant in extricating a car
from a blockage, when the servant could have accomplished the
work himself, no authority to employ assistance can be implied.5
A servant has "no authority, express or implied to call upon by-
standers to assist him in the disciarge of any service which he him-
self could reasonably perform."' 6 According to this line of reason-
ing, the defendant's employee in the instant case was not within the
course of his employment when he requested Mrs. Caldwell to move
the car. Consequently, Mrs. Caldwell became a volunteer and not
a subservant with the result that the defendant wrecking company
should not have been held responsible for her acts of negligence.
The decision in the Fox case suggests that the subjective motiva-
tion'7 of the servant to further the master's business is controlling
over the express instructions of the master, even where the acts are
wrongful or impliedly forbidden by the master, or where not neces-
13. Hanslip v. Hammer, 40 Ohio App. 178, 176 N.E. 19 (1931). The rationale
for charging the master with liability when the specific mode of performance is left
to the servant's determination is that the master must exercise a high degree of care in
the selection of his servants. The degree of care used in selecting servants must be
ascertained from: (1) the nature of the duties to be performed; and (2) the nature of
the instrumentalities under the servant's control. MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 374-387 (2d
ed. 1954).
14. 146 N.Y. 181, 40 N.E. 782 (1895).
15. 146 N.Y. 181, 189, 40 N.E. 782, 783 (1895).
16. Ibid.
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sary or appropriate to best serve the interests of the master and are
merely for the convenience of the servant.' Also interwoven in the
doctrine of respondeat superior is the principle of imputed negli-
gence. 9 Although the limitation here is based on whether a servant
was acting in furtherance of his master's business and within the
scope of his employment, 0 public policy often demands an expan-
sion rather than a limitation of fixing liability.21  It appears that
public policy considerations were controlling in the Fox case. How-
ever, the harshness of Fox may overshadow its usefulness. It is like-
ly that a reasonably prudent employer will be reluctant to accept the
position of guarantor of his employee's conduct, especially when his
employee's conduct is in violation of express instructions or the ser-
vant's conduct is primarily in furtherance of his own convenience
and only incidentally in furtherance of his master's business.
Although the Fox decision was based on principles of law which
are widely recognized and generally accepted, they were wholly in-
applicable to the facts of that particular case. One may wonder
whether this is good justice or merely bad law.
ALBERTA DE CAPITO
17. Recent Decision, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 136, 141 (1961).
18. Fox v. Triplett Auto Wrecking, Inc., 1 Ohio App. 2d 102 (1964).
19. Id. at 105. Imputed negligence renders one person, who has committed no wrong-
ful act of his own, liable for the tort of another.
20. 56 CJ.S. Master and Servant § 181 (1948).
21. Prosser states that "it is now quite generally recognized that the true basis of
such vicarious liability is one of policy.... The losses caused by torts of the servant
which . . . occur in the conduct of the master's enterprise, and are closely connected
with it, are placed upon the employer because he is better able to bear them, and to
distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public." PROSSER,
TORTS § 62, at 351 (2d ed. 1955).
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